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Comment
The Deductibility of Pre-Incorporation Expenses
After a corporation has been organized and has engaged in business opera-
tions, expenses incurred for salaries, travel and entertainment, consulting
fees, legal and accounting fees, marketing surveys, and other similar current
expenditures are deductible if "paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on. any trade or business."'
This comment is concerned with the deduction by recently formed cor-
porations of expenses incurred prior to incorporation. These pre-incorpora-
tion expenses are virtually the same as those incurred by a corporation oper-
ating as a going concern. Thus the distinction between pre-incorporation ex-
penses and expenses is one of timing rather than classification.
Pre-incorporation expenses may be incurred by individuals acting as pro-
moters of the new venture or by a predecessor unincorporated entity, such as
a partnership or joint venture. While pre-incorporation expenses may well
affect the individuals who initially pay these expenses, this comment will focus
on the deductibility of such expenses to the corporation.
2
There are two aspects to the deductibility of pre-incorporation expenses.
Both center around the statutory tests for trade or business deductions as
provided in Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. First, pre-incorpora-
tion expenses must be paid or incurred during the taxable year and second
they must be paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
Meeting the Test of Paid or Incurred During the Taxable Year
In determining whether expenses are "paid or incurred during the taxa-
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a) [hereinafter cited as IRO]. Section 162 also
establishes other tests not related to the question of pre-incorporation expenses.
2. See Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a
Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REv. 567 (1959), for a discussion of the
problems related to individuals who incur expenses incident to the formation of new busi-
ness ventures.
3. IRC § 152.
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able year," consideration should be given to accounting periods, corporation
income tax returns, de facto corporations, the special statutory provision cov-
ering organization expenses, and transfers of property to corporations con-
trolled by the transferors. These considerations relate to the definition of
"taxable year"-a matter of timing--or provide ways to alleviate the re-
strictions of the taxable year through capitalization of amortizable assets with
subsequent periodic deductions.
Timing: The Taxable Year
The key to the timing problem in deducting pre-incorporation expenses is
the taxable year. This is the time span when current expense deductions
are claimed against gross income. 4 Section 441 defines the taxable year as
"the taxpayer's annual accounting period, if it is a calendar year or a fiscal
year. . ... - If the taxpayer's return is for less than 12 months, then the tax-
able year is the period for which the return is made.6
Section 443 provides: "A return for a period of less than 12 months ...
shall be made . .. . [w]hen the taxpayer is in existence during only part of
what would otherwise be his taxable year."' 7 The Income Tax Regulations
give an example of the applicability of Section 443 to new corporations:
If a taxpayer is not in existence for the entire taxable year, a return
is required for the short period during which the taxpayer was in
existence. For example, a corporation organized on August 1 and
adopting the calendar year as its annual accounting period, is re-
quired to file a return for the short period from August 1 to De-
cember 31, and returns for each calendar year thereafter.8
Sections 441 and 443 together with the Regulations, indicate that a new
corporation's taxable year begins when the corporation comes into exist-
ence. The Regulations assume that the corporation comes into existence
on the date it is organized. 9
Although neither the Code nor the Regulations so specify, it may be in-
ferred that the law of the state of incorporation determines the beginning of
4. Id. § 441(a). A taxable year cannot extend beyond twelve months. See I.T.
3466, 1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 238, where a corporation incorporated on November 3, 1939,
was not allowed to file its first return for the fiscal year ending November 30, 1940.
Even though the organization of the corporation was perfected on December 18, 1939,
the return was invalid because it covered more than twelve months.
5. IRC § 441(b)(1).
6. Id. § 441(b)(3).
7. Id. § 443(a)(2).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a)(2) (1960). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2 (1958) for
corporation income tax return filing requirements for short period returns.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a) (2) (1960).
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corporate existence. For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law
declares:
Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of the certificate of
incorporation, executed and acknowledged in accordance with sec-
tion 103, the incorporator or incorporators who signed the certifi-
cate, and his or their successors and assigns, shall, from the date
of such filing, be and constitute a body corporate, by the name set
forth in the certificate .... 10
Applying the Regulations to new Delaware corporations, it appears that
the initial tax return would include only those transactions entered into after
filing the certificate of incorporation. This illustrates the major point un-
derlying both the Code and the Regulations concerning the initial taxable year
and the first return: a corporation cannot begin its initial accounting period
prior to its existence and cannot claim deductions incurred before incorpor-
ation.
De facto Corporations-Looking Behind the Date of Incorporation
Although the Code and the Regulations seem to look to the incorporation
date as the beginning of the initial accounting period, at least two cases have
ignored this date to allow deductions for pre-incorporation expenses.
In Camp Wolters Land Co. v. Commissioner," prior to the date of incor-
poration, promoters acquired land and leased it to the United States for use
as an Army camp. The promoters, who incurred expenses in demolishing a
building on the land several months before its transfer to the new cor-
poration, deducted the expenses on the corporate return. Reversing the
Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the corporation
adopted the contracts made by the promoters:
[E]ven though at the time of the acquisition of the deeds and
leases and the other contracts by the incorporators of taxpayer,
there was no fully born corporation in being and in consequence
the title to the property thus acquired vested in the incorporators
instead of the corporation, such incorporators would hold title
in trust as constructive trustees who could be compelled to convey
the title to the corporation upon its coming into lawful being. ...
The income derived from the property so purchased or leased
by the incorporators for the taxpayer was also held in trust for the
corporation to be formed. Income from the property should or-
dinarily go to him who is the beneficial or real owner and income
taxes ought to be laid against him who owns the income. Since
the corporation was the beneficiary of the income so held in trust
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (1968).
11. 160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1947), rev'g 5 T.C. 336 (1945).
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for it, and since the law allows certain deductions and losses in-
curred in the production of such income, the taxpayer here was
entitled to such deductions as would have been available to it had
it been duly and legally incorporated prior to any of the transac-
tions by its incorporators under consideration here.1
2
The Camp Wolters holding is limited, however, because it deals with a
demolition loss, which the court permitted to be amortized and deducted
ratably over the life of the government lease. This deduction differed from
the usual Section 162 "ordinary and necessary [business] expenses," because it
was an abandonment loss and because it was allowed to be amortized over a
period beyond the year in which the loss occurred.
The apparent limitations of Camp Wolters did not prevent the Tax Court
from later applying its rationale to current expenses. In Canal Navigation &
Trading Co.,'3 the Tax Court permitted the corporation to deduct com-
pensation paid for services rendered by its officers prior to the date of in-
corporation:
We understand from Camp Wolters Land Co. v. Commissioner...
that the corporation is "entitled to such deductions as would have
been available to it had it been duly and legally incorporated prior
to any of the transactions by its incorporators.'
14
The Camp Wolters and Canal Navigation & Trading decisions have been
described as holding the de facto corporations which begin to do business
through their officers and promoters may claim deductions for expenses in-
curred during the period prior to formal incorporation. 15 Camp Wolters has
also been interpreted as holding that "[i]f a de facto corporation attains de jure
status during a taxable year, it is probably to be treated as a single taxpayer
for the entire period." 10
Obligations for Contracts Made Prior to Incorporation
The Camp Wolters decision was based in part on Texas authority which in-
dicated that corporations might expressly or impliedly adopt the contracts of
12. Id. at 88. Cf. Myrtus Corp. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1943), in
which the court found that pre-incorporation income arising from the acts of a bond-
holders' committee which purchased the assets of an insolvent corporation and leased
the purchased assets, was taxable to a new corporation to which the lease was assigned.
The court treated the advance rental received by the committee prior to the date of
incorporation as taxable to the corporation on the theory that it received the benefits
of the lease assigned to it.
13. 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1948).
14. Id. at 912.
15. Weissman, Allowable Deductions on the Formation, Reorganization and Liqui-
dation of a Corporation, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 681, 692 (1959).
16. B. BI"IER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 39 (2d ed. 1966).
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their promoters at the time of organization. 17 The application of the sub-
stantive corporate law of the state of incorporation seems fair. A court
hearing a tax case should not ignore state rules which require corporations to
uphold pre-incorporation contracts. If a court ignores state law requiring
corporations to honor pre-incorporation obligations, the corporation would
have to shoulder the burden of promoters' contracts without the tax bene-
fit of deductions for related pre-incorporation expenses.
An example of a state law which recognizes the possibility of promoters
making contracts on behalf of their to-be-formed corporations is the Mich-
igan statute:
No contract made by the incorporators for or on behalf of any
corporation to be formed preliminary to the filing of the articles
shall be deemed to be invalid or ineffectual because made prior to
such filing, and all property held by such incorporators for the bene-
fit of the proposed corporation shall be deemed to be the property
of such corporation.18
Predecessor Businesses-The Timing Problem Solved by Judicial Allocation
Pre-incorporation expenses may be incurred by non-corporate predecessor
businesses which later choose to incorporate. These expenses appear unre-
lated to the business of the new corporation because they have been incurred
by the predecessor non-corporate entity. The cases dealing with this situa-
tion suggest that the date of incorporation will determine the cutoff date of
the previous entity's business activity and will govern the allocation of income
and expenses between that entity and the new corporation.
In Florida Grocery Co.19 the business began on an unincorporated basis
in October 1916. On April 17, 1917, the corporation was chartered.
On May 28, 1917, stock was issued and a bill of sale executed by the
individuals who owned the unincorporated business, transferring its assets
to the corporation. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the business
operated as a joint venture from January 1, 1917, to May 28, 1917,
and should be taxed as a corporation from May 28, 1917, to the end of the
calendar year.
In Peter W. Rouss20 the Board, in holding that a newly formed corpora-
tion was liable for income tax for the period beginning with its date of incor-
poration on May 13, 1918, rejected the argument that the corporation, in-
17. See 10 TEX. JuR. Corporations § 12 (1930).
18. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.8 (1967).
19. 1 B.T.A. 412 (1925).
20. 4 B.T.A. 516 (1926), sustained, unreported opinion D.C.N.Y., a! 'd, 30 F.2d
628 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 853 (1929).
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stead of the individual taxpayer, should be liable for tax on the net income
for the unincorporated period of that year by saying:
We can not agree with the taxpayer that he [in his capacity as an
individual] is relieved from income tax in respect of the profits to
May 13, 1918, simply because he failed to take an inventory as
of that date. If there were any profits they are chargeable with
income tax. Our problem is simply to determine the amount of
the income from the business, if any, from January 1 to May 13,
1918.21
In Coddington v. Commissioner22 a going concern was transferred to a
newly-formed corporation based on balances in its business books as of July
1, 1919. The date of incorporation was August 18, 1919. The income of
the business, net of deductions, for all of July and part of August was allo-
cated from the corporation to the individual taxpayers. The Board of Tax
Appeals declared:
We have been unable to find in this record anything which we can
construe into either the declaration of a trust in favor of the peti-
tioner and his associates or the effect of producing an association
between them covering the period from July 1 to August 18 or
22 in respect to the ownership of the gains and profits produced
by the business and property ultimately turned over to the cor-
poration on August 22, 1918.2
3
Although Coddington rejected the taxpayer's argument for the existence
of a trust, the Fifth Circuit later applied the trust theory to the actions of the
promoters of the Camp Wolters corporation.2
4
A more recent decision, United States Asiatic Co. v. Commissioner,25 also
denied the corporation deductions for pre-incorporation expenses which re-
lated to a pre-existing business. The Tax Court held:
During all of the above-mentioned periods, the petitioner corpo-
ration was not in existence, either de facto or de jure. Thus, there
is no warrant whatever for its attempt to accrue and deduct, as
expenses of carrying on its own business after incorporation, salary
to [a promoter or incorporator] for preceding periods when he
could not possibly have been either an officer or employee of the
corporation, and business expenses which had been incurred and
paid by [a promoter or incorporator] during said preceding periods
when he was operating either as a joint venturer or as a sole propri-
etor.2 6
21. Id. at 519.
22. 10 B.T.A. 712 (1928).
23. Id. at 715-16.
24. 160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1947).
25. 30 T.C. 1373 (1958).
26. Id. at 1380,
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These cases indicate that a corporation may not deduct pre-incorporation
expenses which cannot be proven to benefit the business of the new corpora-
tion. Characteristically, the denied expenses did not relate to the "carrying
on" of the corporate business, but were only for the benefit of the prede-
cessor enterprise. The Camp Wolters and Canal Navigation & Trading cases
are distinguishable since they upheld deductions of pre-incorporation ex-
penses which were of benefit to the new corporation alone. Thus, pre-incor-
poration expenses may be deducted by the new corporation if the deductions
do not relate to a prior enterprise and are incurred solely for the benefit of
the new entity.
Limited Statutory Recognition of Pre-Incorporation Expenses-Organization
Expenses
In addition to the possiblity of relying on case law for deducting pre-incor-
poration expenses, the taxpayer may look to the Internal Revenue Code for
specific relief in the limited area of organization expenses.
Pre-1954 Treatment
Early Board of Tax Appeals cases held that expenditures to create the
corporation were not deductible because they were capital expenditures.
27
The Tax Court continued the approach of requiring the capitalization of
organization expenses.
28
The items required to be capitalized in the pre-1954 cases were primarily
legal fees. However, in Guarantee Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner
29
a deduction was denied to the corporation for stock issued in payment for
financial planning and management services. And in Recreation Co. v. Com-
missioner,30 a deduction was denied to a corporation for services rendered
chiefly in aid of the petitioner's capital structure.
Section 248-Amortization of Organization Expenses
In 1954 Section 248 was enacted and permitted the amortization of organ-
ization expenses for the first time. An organization expense is an expen-
diture which:
(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation;
(2) is chargeable to the capital account; and
27. See, e.g., W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932); Udolpho
Wolfe Co., 15 B.T.A. 485 (1929).
28. See, e.g., Warner Mountains Lumber Co., 9 T.C. 1171 (1947), acquiesced in,
1948-2 CuM. BuLL. 4.
29. 14 B.T.A. 1015 (1929), aff'd, 44 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1930).
30. 15 B.T.A. 757 (1929).
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(3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a
corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable over such
life.81
The Regulations indicate that "expenditures connected with the issuance or
selling of shares of stock or securities" are not organizational expenses .
2
Presumably the reason for not including these expenses is that they relate not
to the creation of the corporation but to its capital structure. The kinds of
organization expenses which the Regulations do allow include the usual ac-
counting and legal fees necessary to the formation of the corporation. The
statutory authority incident to the creation of the corporation shown in (1)
above should be liberally interpreted to include more than accounting and
legal fees because organization expenditures often include such things as sal-
aries paid or incurred for services rendered by promoters and future officers,
office rent, travel expenses, and supplies.
There is an absence of cases after 1954 either allowing or disallowing the
amortization of organizational expenses beyond accounting and legal serv-
ices. This absence of litigation could be interpreted as an optimistic sign
that financial planning (not of a kind related to the raising of capital) and
management advisory expenses are being considered incident to the crea-
tion of the corporation and are, therefore, amortizable. However, in view
of the narrow interpretation shown in the Regulations and the absence of
case law, Section 248 might be a weak reed on which to rely for support in
deducting pre-incorporation expenses which fall outside the defined cate-
gories 83
Deductions for Liabilities Assumed by the New Corporation in Section 351
Transactions
Section 351 permits the non-recognition of gain upon the transfer of property
to a corporation in exchange for stock.3 4 The transfer of liabilities related to
the property generally will not result in the recognition of gain to the trans-
feror.35 Consequently, it is common for owners of predecessor businesses to
transfer liabilities which arose prior to the transfer (and usually prior to the
date of incorporation) to the new corporation. This practice has received
judicial attention as evidenced by the following cases.
31. IRC § 248(b).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (1956).
33. Cf. Weissman, supra note 15 at 701, wherein he suggests that the value of
stock issued for services should be includible as an organizational expense under Sec-
tion 248.
34. IRC § 351.
35. Id. § 357(a). But see IRC § 357(b) and (c).
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In Holdcroft Transportation Co. v. Commissioner"6 a deduction was
denied to a corporation which had assumed a contingent liability of a pre-
decessor partnership on the ground that the contingent liability "did not arise
out of the operation of the business" of the corporation. The court held that
the payment of the contingent liability by the corporation was not an operat-
ing expense or loss of the incorporated business but should be treated as part
of the acquistion cost of the property from the partnership.37 Although the
court did not determine whether any portion of the disallowed deduction
could be added to the basis of the depreciable property, Section 351 limits
the transferee's basis to that of the transferor.
3 8
In Doggett v. Commissioner"9 an individual on the cash basis of account-
ing transferred his business to a newly formed corporation. The individual
was denied deduction of expenses incurred prior to the date of incorporation
but actually paid by the new corporation. In denying the deduction the court
said:
To the extent these payables arose out of the business they should
be deductible by someone, but the taxpayer, an individual on the
cash basis, is met with the objection that he did not pay them.
Perhaps he could have provided for the payment in due course of
these payables by the corporation as his agent, but he did not do
that. What he might have done is not so important as the fact that
he did not commit himself at the time. To reserve the right, after the
event, advisedly, if advised at all, to attribute the deduction to the
corporation or to its sole stockholder, offends notions of justice
in taxation. That one or the other should be allowed to claim the
deduction, therefore, does not require the conclusion that the indi-
vidual cash basis taxpayer, who chose to transfer the obligation
without payment, is now entitled, as a matter of law, to claim what
he did not then claim unequivocally.
40
While the Doggett decision did not discuss the possible deduction of the
disallowed expenses by the corporation, it is possible that under the Hold-
croft rule, they would not be deductible by the corporation but treated as part
36. 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946), ajfg CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 508 (1945). See Crop-
per, Tax Problems of Accounts Payable and Receivable Upon Incorporating a Cash
Basis Taxpayer, 6 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 216 (1966), for a discussion of Holdcrojt and
other related decisions.
37. See also Athol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 230 (Ist Cir. 1931), where a
corporation was denied deduction for expenses (1) attributable to a predecessor corpo-
ration, and (2) resulting from the assumption of the predecessor's liabilities by Athol.
The court held that the payment of the expenses were part of the purchase price of the
assets of the predecessor and constituted a capital, not a business expenditure.
38. See IRC §§ 351(e)(2), 362(a).
39. 275 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1960), afj'g 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 873 (1958),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960).
40. Id. at 827.
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of the acquisition cost of the assets. The noteworthy aspect of the Doggett
case is the dictum: "one or the other should be allowed to claim the deduc-
tion."
In Arthur L. KniIfen4I a cash basis individual taxpayer attempted to de-
duct expenses that he had transferred to a newly-formed corporation. The
Tax Court denied the deduction to the individual taxpayer rejecting his con-
tention that he was on the accrual basis and that he had "paid" the business
expenses in question by transferring them to the corporation. 42 In striking
down this argument, the court cited Doggett and Citizens National Trust and
Savings Bank v. Welch.43  Since the issue of deductibility by the corporation
had not been presented, the court did not decide whether the corporation
should receive the benefit of deducting the expenses or whether the corpora-
tion should be required to apply the payment of the assumed liabilities to its
cost of assets.
A recent case with facts similar to those in Holdcroft44 is United States
v. McIver & Smith Fabricators, Inc.45 Here the court remanded to deter-
mine whether the payment of a contingent obligation of a predecessor busi-
ness should be a deduction of the transferor corporation and said:
If the corporation at its inception assumed a contingent obligation
to pay ... it is that assumption of liability which obligated the cor-
poration and not any subsequent legitimate business purpose. In oth-
er words, the corporation did not have to pay because of the unfa-
vorable judgment or because its directors deemed payment advis-
able, but rather the corporation paid because it assumed the obliga-
tion when it became incorporated. If. . .factual inquiry reveals a
primary purpose other than the acquisition of property, the court
may properly allow a deduction to the corporation if all of the re-
quirements of Title 26, U.S.C., Sec. 162, are met, i.e., whether
"ordinary", "necessary", "paid or incurred during the taxable
41. 39 T.C. 553 (1962).
42. Id. at 567.
43. 119 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1941). In Citizens Nat'l Trust, expenses of a predecessor
corporation were disallowed on the ground that the predecessor, which used the cash
basis method of accounting, did not pay the expenses. From the facts of the case, it
appears that the Commissioner actually permitted the successor to deduct the pre-con-
solidation expenses. However, the court did not accept the predecessor's theory that
the successor paid the expenses as agent for the predecessor, and that accordingly the
predecessor should be able to deduct the expenses even though it did not pay them. The
Citizens Nat'l Trust case is interesting because it holds that a "non-existent corpora-
tion" (i.e., the predecessor which went out of existence after the consolidation) cannot
have an agent. Perhaps this explains why the agency theory has not been applied to sit-
uations where promoters act on behalf of to-be-formed, but "non-existent" corporations.
Nevertheless, because of its unusual facts, the Citizens Nat'l Trust case holds scant
applicability to the pre-incorporation deduction problem.
44. See note 36 supra, and accompanying text.
45. 418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969).
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year", and "in carrying on any trade or business."'46
While the decision of the case on remand was not reported, the instructions
of the court hold out fresh hope that judicial consideration will be given to
the possibility that liabilities assumed may be deducted under Section 162 by
the transferee corporation.
47
The cases discussed in this section on deductions for liabilities assumed in
Section 351 are marked by distinguishing fact situations but can be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) The Holdcroft rule which requires assumed liabilities to be
capitalized (with the result of no current deductions or increase
in depreciable basis) has been eroded by at least one case.
(2) If the corporation can make a good showing that current busi-
ness motives-not a legal obligation-motivated the payment of a
predecessor's liability, then a deduction for the payment thereof
may be allowed.
(3) Judicial notice has been taken of the problem that someone
ought to be able to deduct liabilities which are transferred.
Meeting the Test of "Carrying on any Trade or Business"
Even if pre-incorporation expenses can be attributed to the corporation as
having been "paid or incurred" during the taxable year,48 Section 162(a)
imposes the further requirement that the expenses be paid or incurred in "car-
rying on any trade or business."
'49
Expenses which have been incurred by companies in the developmental
stage may be described as "pre-operating" expenses because they are in-
curred by corporations which have not begun operations of the business for
which they were created. 0 Thus, a new corporation has the burden of
providing that (1) pre-incorporation expenses are attributable to its taxable
46. Id. at 596-97.
47. See also Estate of Walling v. Comm'r, 373 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'g
45 T.C. 111 (1965), wherein the court remanded the case for an allocation of repair ex-
penses between the transferor partners' individual returns and the corporation's return.
The partners had agreed to pay for a repair expense as a condition to the Section 351
transfer of barges to the new corporation. The repairs were not actually made until after
the barges were transferred to the corporation and after the date of incorporation. The
court suggested the possibility that the repairs might relate to operations of the barges
after the transfer as well as before the transfer and called for an allocation pursuant to
Section 482. This case has limited application due to the nature of the expenses and be-
cause expenses for the repairs were not actually incurred prior to the date of incorpora-
tion.
48. IRC § 162(a).
49. Id.
50. See Wharton, Accounting and Reporting for Companies in the Development
Stage, 130 J. ACCOUNTANCY 39 (1970), for a recent discussion of financial accounting
treatment of pre-operating expenses. See also Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They
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year, and (2) it was carrying on a trade or business when the expenses
were incurred-i.e., that the expenses were not "pre-operating" expenses. Of
course if successful application of the Camp Wolters and Canal Navigation
& Trading theories5' is accomplished on the issue of timing, the only prob-
lem remaining is meeting the "carrying on any trade or business" test.
In Radio Station WBIR, Inc.5 2 and World Publishing Co. v. Commis-
sioner,13 payments made in advance of obtaining broadcasting licenses were
denied as deductions on the grounds that the respective taxpayer corpora-
tions were not "carrying on a trade or business" when the payments were
made.
Another broadcasting case, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States,
54
held that training and other pre-operating expenses incurred by a corpo-
ration prior to the time it received a television broadcasting license from
the Federal Communications Commission were not deductible. The de-
nied expenses were principally salaries paid to a trained staff assembled
in advance to permit the station to be operational immediately after obtain-
ing the license from the FCC. The court viewed these expenditures as capital
in nature, describing them as "the acquisition of a capital asset whose value
to the taxpayer would continue for many years, even though from time to
time individual staff members could be expected to leave its employ." 55
However, an express company's pre-operating expenses were held to be
deductible in Southeastern Express Co.56 Although the Southeastern Ex-
press case has not been mentioned in later Tax Court cases, neither has it
been overruled. 57 The company, which incurred administrative expenses for
several months prior to the date it began operations, was allowed to deduct
those expenses against revenue received after it began operations. The
Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes? 48 TAXES 488 (1970);
Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521 (1968).
51 See text accompanying notes 11-16, supra.
52. 31 T.C. 803 (1959).
53. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'g 35 T.C. 7 (1960).
54. 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965).
55. Id. at 907. See also Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410
(4th Cir. 1965), on remand from 382 U.S. 68 (1965), where the corporation's later at-
tempt at claiming amortization of the capital asset thus created by the pre-operating ex-
penditures was unsuccessful. The circuit court denied the amortization benefit on the
ground that the costs represented an asset with an unlimited useful life.
56. 19 B.T.A. 490 (1930).
57. Weissman, supra note 15 at 692, comments that "[tihe decision in Southeastern
seems to be based on an unwarranted and erroneous conception of what is encompassed
by the phrase 'organization expenses'. Clearly it was intended to include only the
expenses of creating the corporate entity and ought not to be stretched to include ex-
penses incurred subsequent to incorporation even though arising preparatory to the con-
duct of business."
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express company was incorporated in October, 1920. In its tax return for
1921, it deducted expenses incurred for traveling, postage, stationery,
salaries of clerks, and other miscellaneous expenses incurred during the pe-
riod January 1, 1921 to May 1, 1921. The Board of Tax Appeals
allowed these expenses, which were clearly pre-operating in nature, even
though the company did not begin carrying express packages until May
1, 1921. The Board was careful to identify and require capitalization
of the non-deductible portion of the expenditures which were related to form-
ing the corporation and selling capital stock. The Internal Revenue Service
acquiesced in the part of the decision dealing with the permitted deductibility
of pre-operating expenses.58 It appears that the factor distinguishing this
case from the broadcasting cases previously cited is that the pre-operating
expenses were incurred in the same taxable year in which operations began
and income was first received.
In Petersburg Television Corp.5 9 the Tax Court permitted the deduction
of expenses incurred during the taxpayer's fiscal year which ended August
31, 1955. The court limited the deductions to the period after September
29, 1954, the date on which the corporation was granted a construction per-
mit by the Federal Communications Commission. This holding is notewor-
thy since the corporation did not begin revenue-producing broadcasting op-
erations until August 15, 1955, just 16 days before the end of the taxable
year ended August 31, 1955.
Thus, based on Southeastern Express and Petersburg Television it seems
that so long as a corporation begins to carry on operations, i.e., produce
revenue, within a taxable year, there is a possibility that all the expenses in-
curred in the year in which income is first received from operations will be
deductible in that first year of actual operation.60
The Camp Wolters and Canal Navigation & Trading decisions allowed
the deduction of pre-operating expenses incurred during the pre-incorpora-
tion period. In these cases the span of time consisting of the period during
which the pre-incorporation expenses were incurred and the initial short tax-
able year of the corporation did not extend beyond one year.6 However, it is
clear from Richmond Television and Petersburg Television that pre-opera-
58. X-1 CuM. BULL. 61 (1931).
59. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 271 (1961).
60. See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 904, 908 (4th
Cir. 1965), indicating that revenue producing activity is a requirement for "carrying on
any trade or business."
61. The facts in Canal Navigation & Trading do not disclose whether the services
rendered by the promoters were fully performed in the taxable year ending December 31,
1941, or whether they were partially performed in 1940 as well as in 1941. The court
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ting expenses incurred before operations begin will not be deductible be-
cause that are not incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
To the extent that pre-operating expenses are held not to be current ex-
penses deductible under Section 162, they must be capitalized as the cost of
developing the business idea.6 2 Presumably the tax benefit from these capi-
talized expenses, unless they can be proven to have a utility of limited dura-
tion, must be deferred until the corporation is liquidated or the related busi-
ness activity is abandoned.
Thus, the important criterion for the deductibility of expenses incurred in
advance of operations is that operations actually begin later in that same
taxable year. It makes no difference if the new corporation incurs a loss dur-
ing its first year of operations. An example of this is Hillcone Steamship
Co.63 in which deductions for expenses incurred in quarry leasing and tim-
ber cutting businesses were allowed on the following rationale:
The businesses. . . were actually engaged in during the years here
involved.... Each of these enterprises proved unprofitable...
but. . . we conclud[ed] that each was engaged in a business under-
taken with the intent to make a profit during the years here in
issue . 64
seemingly minimizes this problem by relying on Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281
U.S. 115 (1930), which permits deductions for compensation for services rendered in a
prior year if the obligation to pay compensation is created during the current year.
62. In Mid-State Products Co., 21 T.C. 696 (1954), the taxpayer corporation had
been in the egg business for several years. In its taxable year ending November 30,
1941, the corporation incurred salary, travel, telephone and other expenses in connec-
tion with the development of a new business-producing dried eggs for the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The expenses related to the development of the contracts for the dried eggs
were capitalized and deferred as of November 30, 1941, and deducted by the taxpayer
according to a formula based on dried egg production in its taxable years ending Novem-
ber 30, 1942, and November 30, 1943. The court stated:
Here the expenditures were designed and intended to increase the earning ca-
pacity of petitioner beyond that of the shell egg business, for which it was or-
ganized and in which it was engaged, by setting up and establishing a new
and additional business, namely, that of producing and selling dried eggs in
which operations actually began in the next succeeding year.
Id. at 714. The court also denied amortization on the ground that "[niot all capital
assets are wasting assets." Id.
A later case, Hillcone Steamship Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1096, 1108 (1963), sug-
gested that in Mid-States Products, "the taxpayer on its records had capitalized expendi-
tures incurred in preparing to enter a new business." This tends to indicate that when a
corporation voluntarily represents through entries in its accounting records that the pre-
operating expenditures are capital in nature, the corporation will be in a difficult posi-
tion to argue that the expenditures are current expenses or even amortizable costs for
tax purposes.
63. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1096 (1963).
64. Id. at 1107-08. The Tax Court distinguished this case from Radio Station WBIR,
31 T.C. 803 (1959), in which no business (regardless of profitability) was being car-
ried on while expenses were incurred.
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To summarize the effect of the series of cases interpreting the "carrying
on any trade or business" requirement of Section 162:
(1) The corporation must have operations in the year it attempts
to deduct pre-operating expenses (which may be either pre- or
post-incorporation expenses).
(2) A corporation may generate a loss in its first year of opera-
tions. Even so, the pre-operating expenses incurred in the first
year of operations will be deductible so long as the corporation is
"carrying on any trade or business."
(3) A corporation which incurs pre-operating expenses in a year
prior to the year it begins operations is not able to deduct the pre-
operating expenses. Nevertheless, there may be other avenues
leading to deductions. For example, a corporation may attribute
its pre-operating expenses in non-Section 351 transfers to the cost
of amortizable assets with a determinable useful life. However, this
tactic is not free from risk that assets so designated might be held
to be non-amortizable.
Conclusion
The deductibility of pre-incorporation expenses depends upon meeting the
requirements of Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code which requires that
the expenses be incurred in the taxable year and be the result of carrying on a
trade or business.
It would appear that many taxpayer corporations risk losing the deductions
for pre-incorporation expenses simply because the expenses are incurred
prior to the first taxable year in which operations commence. Since there
is neither specific authority in the Internal Revenue Code nor permission
in the Income Tax Regulations for the deduction of pre-incorporation ex-
penses, would-be promoters should be advised to incorporate and begin
revenue-producing operations within the initial taxable year of the new cor-
poration. A postponement of the date of incorporation or the date upon
which operations commence may necessitate litigation by the taxpayer cor-
poration in order to sustain the deduction of expenses incurred in years
prior to the year of incorporation or the year in which operations commence.
Wendell W. Wiener
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